When some people feel alienated from the state captured by the
elite, one response could be an assertion of these people based on
their different social identities, that is, religion, race, ethnicity, caste,region. Obviously, such assertion is possible only if the ruling eliteand displeased sections of the ruled have different social identities.
Such an assertion is less likely in relatively homogenous societies
where most share similar religious, ethnic, racial identities. Even if
there is discontent among some sections of society, their assertion
is less likely to be successful if they are only a very small minority
or when such people are scattered around different parts of the
country.
We have already mentioned the identities or groups of people
who may constitute these social counter-elites. These include a
specific race, caste, religion, ethnic group or people living in a subregion who share some aspects of identity and a feeling that the
ruling elite does not represent them. Some of these identities, such
as religion, are changeable but others are not. A particular social
identity may represent the marginalised in one context, whereas
the same could be the dominant one in another context.
Religions,such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Hinduism represent the marginalised groups in certain situations even when these are the identities of the ruling elites in certain other contexts.
It could be that one such group feels an explicit marginalisation
by the state in a situation or that the people who share the feeling of
such marginalisation may happen to share the same social identity.
In rare cases, people who perceive marginalisation may create a
common social identity—say, by converting into one religion. In
those cases, a homogenous identity is created after the perceived
marginalisation, but in most cases it is perceived as an outcome of
their identity different from that of the ruling elites.
In certain situations, some of these marginalised social groups
are able to capture power from the ruling elites. Such capturing
can be through democratic or non-democratic means. If the marginalised
social group is the majority and their identity is distinct
from the ruling elite, then the capture by these non-elites is relatively
easier either through democracy or through the violent or
non-violent overthrowing of the prevailing regime through nondemocraticways.
To some extent, the success of the independence
struggles can be seen as a part of such non-elite capture when we
see foreign rulers as the elites with a different social identity. Here,
national identity becomes the mobilising slogan for capturing the
state from foreign elites. Even in those cases where the ruling elites
are from within the country but are viewed inadequately nationalistic,
there can be mobilisations on the basis of nationalism. Hence,
such nationalist capture of the state can also be counted as part of
social counter-elite captures. However, the people who capture the
state on the basis of nationalist slogans can also be elites who were
not part of the previous rulers.
There can be different layers of counter-elites. For example, in
the context where a country is ruled by the elites from the dominant
social group, the marginalised social groups may be driving the
counter-elite capture. However, there could be a small section of
elite even among the marginalised social groups, and they may be
leading the counter-elite mobilisation and the capture. Or if there
were no such elites, it could be possible to have the emergence of
an elite section in due course in these marginalised groups which
capture the state. There could be opposition to these new elites
who control the state, and it can lead to another counter-elite
capture.
Hence, counter-elite capture need not be seen as leading
to the disappearance of the elite capture forever, but there could
be repetitions of elite and counter-elite captures. But this would
eventually lead to greater democratisation, and, as we see in the
following paragraphs, a widening of the distribution of public
resources to the majority.
It is possible to see some sections of non-elite capturing the
state even when they are not the majority. Some divisions among
the other sections of people could bring in a particular minority
group into power. This could also be due to superior armed (or
violent) power with or without the help of external forces. One
could see regimes formed by minority social groups propped up
or supported by foreign powers. An extreme form of this is the
foreign rule itself which is legitimised in the name of supporting
the oppressed minorities.
One can also see formal or informal
coalitions among different non-elite social groups leading to the
capture of the state through democracy.
There could be some cases where people at large or a substantial
section of the ruled support military takeover when the elites
who ruled (either as part of a formal democracy or as dictators)
were seen as ineffective or socially harmful. (This is slightly different from the transition wherein one elite dictator is replaced by another one—possibly from the army.) There are some elements
of counter-elite capture here if the power gets transferred from the
disliked or unpredictable ruler to a rule-bound regime. However,
such military takeovers need not necessarily lead to the changes
in the allocation of public resources that we will discuss in the
following sections.
Impacts of Social Counter-Elite Capture
One need not expect structural changes like the decline of feudalism
as part of social counter-elite capture. This is so because there
could be cases where landlords and tenants (and agricultural
workers) share the same identity (say that of a religion or region),
and their joint capture of the state through a struggle based on this
identity is less likely to work against these landlords. Instead, it
could be that these landlords have played a leadership role in this
counter-elite capture, enabling the continuation of their dominant
role after the state capture.
Provision of Private Goods
Since the driving force behind the counter-elite capture is the perceived marginalisation, it is reasonable to assume that a substantial section of the people representing such group belongs to the poor or economically vulnerable sections. These sections would not have benefitted much from the limited distribution of private goods
under the elite capture. This could be one important reason for, or
the manifestation of, the perceived marginalisation. Hence, there
would be pressures on the counter-elites who capture the state
to enhance the distribution of private goods (including transfer
of public resources for private consumption) to these sections of
society. This has two impacts: the coverage of private goods distribution
goes up in such contexts, and, secondly, the share of public
resources needed for such private goods distribution (or transfer)
would increase.
We have argued that under elite-capture, a substantial part of
the burden of public goods distribution or individual welfare (such
as the support needed for an unemployed or an aged worker) was
more likely borne by the smaller units of the ruled, such as family,
kinships, communities, landlord and people working them, and
so on. However, as a part of the counter-elite capture, some part
of this burden could be taken over by, or transferred to, the state.
This could happen because it was with the active support and
participation of some of these ‘ruled’ units that the counter-elites
came to power. Hence, counter-elite capture inevitably leads to
certain expansion of the government in terms of its actual reach.
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