The evolution depends partly on whether their rule is operating
in a democratic context or not. In this view, one sees democracy
as an exogenous variable, but the evolution of democracy can also
be viewed as an endogenous process undergoing transition from
elite capture to counter-elite capture and to more advanced forms
of government. See Box 3.1 for a discussion on this issue.
If a country is relatively uninfluenced, say through colonialism or other
such processes from outside, evolution of democracy there could be
mainly due to internal factors. Then one should not expect ‘democracy’
when it is ruled by the elites, unless the elites want to have democracy
which could be less likely. The elites may prefer democracy in very rare
cases, if they do not see a threat to themselves as part of democracy.
A benevolent elite, who sees the need for democracy, may be needed
to make it happen or such benevolence is needed even to make the
population not to overthrow the elite rule under democracy. However,
a counter-elite capture of the state would become relatively easier when
such democracy exists.
There are not many examples of this kind from actual experience.
One could see more cases where elite capture coincided with nondemocratic
periods. Under such a situation, counter-elite capture
would take place through non-democratic means. They need not have
incentives to bring in democracy immediately, especially if they are not
aided by democracy-oriented outsiders. In fact, as we will discuss in the
next chapter, democracy was not preferred explicitly under one form
of counter-elite capture, that is, by the underclass parties. If democracy
was not there as part of elite and counter-elite captures, then it could
(Box 3.1 contd)
Box 3.1:
Is Democracy Exogenous or Endogenous?
If a country is relatively uninfluenced, say through colonialism or other
such processes from outside, evolution of democracy there could be
mainly due to internal factors. Then one should not expect ‘democracy’
when it is ruled by the elites, unless the elites want to have democracy
which could be less likely. The elites may prefer democracy in very rare
cases, if they do not see a threat to themselves as part of democracy.
A benevolent elite, who sees the need for democracy, may be needed
to make it happen or such benevolence is needed even to make the
population not to overthrow the elite rule under democracy. However,
a counter-elite capture of the state would become relatively easier when
such democracy exists.
There are not many examples of this kind from actual experience.
One could see more cases where elite capture coincided with nondemocratic
periods. Under such a situation, counter-elite capture
would take place through non-democratic means. They need not have
incentives to bring in democracy immediately, especially if they are not
aided by democracy-oriented outsiders. In fact, as we will discuss in the
next chapter, democracy was not preferred explicitly under one form
of counter-elite capture, that is, by the underclass parties. If democracy
was not there as part of elite and counter-elite captures, then it could
evolve at the next stage when elites or their residuals and counter-elites
compete. We will discuss this in Chapter 5.
Hence, countries which are not democratic today are predominantly
sustaining either elite capture or counter-elite capture. One could see
non-democratic countries in the middle east (Saudi Arabia, UAE, etc.)
which are elite-capture states. Similarly, one can see non-democratic
situations where counter-elites have captured the power decimating
competition from previously ruling elites, and, in most cases, the captured
counter-elites have become ruling elites. This is the situation in
places where under-class mobilisations have captured power, such as
in North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, etc. This could also be seen in a few
African nations where rulers have come to power by mobilising people
on the basis of ethnic or racial identity.
One could see democracy coming to exist in some countries even
without an internal political transition from elite capture to counterelite
capture. The formal democracy that came to exist in India and
Pakistan is an example of this case. The case of Afghanistan is another
example. This was primarily due to the existence or influence of colonial
rulers or other foreign governments which played an important role,
at different points in history, in deciding the formal nature of the government.
When one country which sustains democracy after passing
through phases of elite and counter-elite capture plays an important
role in deciding the nature of the government of another country, the
former’s notions on ideal form of government may influence the latter’s
transformation. Thus, we could see democracy coming to exist even in
countries where elites continue to rule. Some of these countries may
occasionally relapse into non-democracy, as we have seen in the case
of Pakistan or Bangladesh. Thus, the existence of formal democracy
in such contexts need not change the real nature of governance much,
even though democracy may exert some influence on the process of
transition or on the shaping of the upper boundaries of what elite or
counter-elites, who capture the state, can do there. Moreover, the presence
of formal democracy may change the perceptions of some people
in that country on the possibilities of ordering governance.
leaders) may improve drastically as part of state capture. Thus,
they may become affluent in terms of private goods consumption.
The privileged access to state power may also enhance the income
or wealth status of some members of the counter-elites. Use of
public resources and the resources mobilised from the capitalists,
who develop a close relationship with them, could be the source
of income for the leaders of counter-elites. They may not see much
problem in the private use of public resources because that was
more or less the practice under elite capture. There are a number
of examples from India where the leaders of social counter-elite
mobilisations who came from modest economic backgrounds had
become economic elites after decades of leading their governments.
Although they could not become dictators due to the national
democracy in India, such cases could be seen in other parts of
the developing world. Saddam Hussein and Gaddafi could be
examples in this regard.
This ascendance to affluence which may occur among the rulers
of counter-elite capture is unlikely to happen for the social group as
a whole, which fought against the previously ruling elite. However,
there can be different forms of legitimisation for some among
the counter-elites becoming affluent and richer. They are part of
the leadership, and hence higher rewards for the efforts made to
mobilise people may be legitimised. There could be other identitybased
rationalisations. The social group which was marginalised
under the elite rule may derive certain ‘happiness’ in seeing that
some among them could become elite with all the associated
frills, and there could be attempts to rationalise the creation of
such new elites.
The affluence of a section of counter-elites under their capture of
the state may enhance their demand for public goods. The capitalists
who develop cosy relationship with them may also pressurise
them to provide more public goods. These may be in the form of
infrastructure (roads, ports, other transport infrastructure, policing
and so on). Thus, gradually, the counter-elites may develop incentives
to provide greater amount of such public goods, even if
such incentives do not exist in the beginning of the counter-elite
capture. However, such improvement in the provision of public goods need not go along with an improvement in governance.
This is so because the ruling counter-elites and the capitalists
associated with them are likely to benefit from a filtered or mediated
access to public services, in general, and also the sustenance
of monopoly power.
0 comments :
Post a Comment