Considering the importance of media in terms of governance, it
is interesting to think about the place of media in counter-elite
capture. In this situation, the media controlled by the state will be
under the control of new rulers. Hence, this media may change
itself to represent the interest of the new rulers and their constituency(within the boundary of inefficiencies inherent to such statecontrolled media). On the other hand, if there were non-state media under elite capture (owned by sections of elites), it may continue to exist even under counter-elite capture if the new rulers do not ban or take over all such non-state media.
This part of the media may emerge as forums for representing the interest of the previously ruling elite. This may lead to some competition within the media, provided the current rulers do not impose censorship rules Such censorship rules and/or a ban could happen at different
stages of counter-elite capture, since they might see the existence
of a media independent from the current rulers as a threat to their
regime.
(This is much more so when the counter-elite capture is
carried out by an under-class party. We have seen the ban of all
independent media in most of the socialist states, which we will
discuss in the next chapter.)
However, the pre-existing independent media in certain situations,
especially under social counter-elite capture, may come
out with different strategies to overcome this restrictive environment.
There could be strategic collaboration with the new rulers
or strategic silence (including non-criticism of the government).
Their interest need not be the mere existence or the profitability of
the media firm. Usually media houses have interests beyond the
revenue from its operation, and this could be that of furthering
the interests of other businesses or at the broader level, furthering
the interests of social groups working behind the media firm.
The elites even when they are out of power have some advantages,
compared to non-elites when they are out of power.
The former is likely to have access to financial resources, especially if the counter-elite rulers have not captured all the private assets held by the sections of elite. Even if such capturing of resources has been attempted, some of the elites may have transferred a part of the resources to outside the country or may have developed significant social capital outside, and these may help them in periods of ‘oppression’ by the counter-elite. Thus, they may be able to mobilise resources to sustain media representing their interest.
The presence of the media representing elite-interest and that
of counter-elite through its control over state media may lead to
some level of competition within media (if the system is not one
of absolute dictatorship). Such competition within media may
facilitate competition within politics. The competition within media
and competition within politics have a correspondence relationship
(one helping the other and vice versa). It is obvious that the media
supporting the elite is likely to help the spread of oppositional
information to a wider population in the context of counter-elite
capture. Media opposing the government has an interest to enhance
its subscriber base. This can gradually facilitate an adversarial
public discourse within the country, and this in turn may facilitate
the movement towards competitive democracy.
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